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STATE LAW HOLOCAUST-ERA ART CLAIMS AND 
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE POWER 
Jennifer Anglim Kreder* 
Doctrines of judicial restraint in international cases take many forms, 
but they all have at their heart a concern about the proper role of courts, be 
they federal or state.  This Article explores the proper role of courts in de-
ciding state law conversion claims for art stolen or subject to forced or du-
ress sale during the Nazi era.  Many presume, incorrectly, that such claims 
must be precluded by separation of powers and federalism doctrines.  This 
Article demonstrates the inaccuracy of such presumptions. 
Holocaust-era claims lie at the intersection of separation of powers and 
federalism doctrines, neither of which restricts the courts in this context.  
To explain, it is necessary to cover quite a bit of doctrine.  Thus, this Article 
is divided into the following parts.  Part I discusses the general roles of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, as 
well as state versus federal government, in regard to foreign affairs—
historically and in today‘s globalized world.  Part II specifically addresses 
Holocaust-era art claims by offering the history essential to understanding 
the Holocaust-era art problem.  Part III discusses the role of judicial restitu-
tion in the United States in augmenting executive policy to restitute Holo-
caust-era art, regardless of whether claims are filed in federal or state 
courts.  Part IV, with a special emphasis on one particularly problematic 
Ninth Circuit case, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasade-
na,1 analyzes how courts, seemingly out of a misguided attempt to avoid in-
truding on foreign affairs, are misapplying state law time-bar and other 
technical doctrines in Holocaust-art litigation.  In light of the emphasis in 
this Article on judicial restitution failures, Part V discusses present legal ef-
forts to restore power to claimants seeking restitution of Holocaust-era art.  
Part VI concludes that it is essential for the Supreme Court to correct the 
judicial errors and reclaim the judicial role in Holocaust-era art restitution.  
If it fails to do so, neither Congress nor the executive branch is likely to 






  Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University Chase College of Law. 
1
  592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010) (link). 
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I. GOVERNMENTAL ROLES – HISTORICALLY AND TODAY 
The executive branch of the federal government is the primary actor in 
waging war,2 including post-war criminal prosecutions and reparations, and 
foreign affairs generally.3  Congress, the other political branch, also has a 
role when it comes to war and foreign affairs, though smaller than the ex-
ecutive.4  The judiciary, however, has traditionally refrained from weighing 
in on foreign policy.  In 1918, the Supreme Court distinguished the two po-
litical branches from the judiciary in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.5 and 
held that in matters of foreign affairs, ―the propriety of what may be done in 
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or deci-
sion.‖6 
The Court‘s early pronouncements denied the states any role in foreign 
relations.  In 1941, the Court stated, ―Our system of government is such that 
the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the 
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the 
field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interfe-
rence.‖7 
Nevertheless, today federal and state courts and legislatures frequently 
make decisions that potentially or actually impact foreign relations.8  Some-
times, their decisions go too far and disrupt the federal executive branch‘s 
power and responsibility to speak with one voice for the nation.  For exam-
ple, when the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that pro-





  See Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)) (―[T]he President has ‗unique responsibility‘ for the conduct of ‗foreign 
and military affairs.‘‖) (link); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1942) (link). 
3
  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (link); First Nat‘l City Bank v. Banco Nacional 
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972) (link); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 485 (D.N.J. 
1999) (―The executive branch has always addressed claims for reparations as claims between govern-
ments.‖) (link). 
4
  See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) (link). 
5
  246 U.S. 297 (1918) (link). 
6
  Id. at 302; accord Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (―It 
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify ac-
tions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.  Nor can courts sit in camera in order 
to be taken into executive confidences.‖) (link). 
7
  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (link); accord The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 
581, 605–06 (1889) (link). 
8
  See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292–93 (2010) (holding that high-ranking go-
vernmental individuals sued for torture-related claims are not entitled to foreign sovereign immunity) 
(link); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697, 738 (2004) (dismissing claims under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act brought by an individual kidnapped in Mexico and brought into the United States to 
face criminal charges for torturing and murdering a Drug Enforcement Agency agent) (link); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo Bay detainees had habeas corpus rights) 
(link); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431, 443 (1989) (holding 
there was no jurisdiction to hear claim of Liberian corporation against Argentina for sinking of its oil 
tanker during time of war) (link). 
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Burma, it stated that ―the ‗nuances‘ of ‗the foreign policy of the United 
States . . . are much more [i.e., not exclusively] the province of the Execu-
tive Branch and Congress than of this Court.‘‖9  The Court has recently 
claimed some judicial power implicating foreign affairs for the judiciary.  
For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court proclaimed its power to 
check the political branches, even in times of war.10 
In today‘s globalized world, where governments often act as private 
actors and individual rights are increasingly superseding old conceptions of 
sovereignty,11 modern interpretation of judicial deference doctrines con-
trol.12  The act of state doctrine provides a poignant example.  Whereas 
courts had been using the doctrine ―to avoid deciding difficult cases,‖13 the 
Supreme Court in 1990 in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tecton-
ics Corp. cautioned against ―expansion‖ of the doctrine and stated: ―The 
short of the matter is this: Courts in the United States have the power, and 
ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly pre-
sented to them.‖14  Thus, although the political branches dominate foreign 
affairs, under recent Supreme Court precedent a court may not shirk its con-
stitutional responsibility just because the executive branch may bristle at its 
ruling.15 
II. MINIMAL HOLOCAUST-ERA ART BACKGROUND 
Some minimum background is essential to understand the point of this 
Article, that federal and state courts must exercise jurisdiction to fulfill their 
duties and obligations to resolve cases and controversies surrounding art 
that was stolen or sold in forced or duress conditions during World War II.  
It is commonly estimated not only that the Nazis stole twenty percent of all 





  Crosby v. Nat‘l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386 (2000) (quoting Container Corp. of 
Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983)) (link). 
10
  542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (―We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of comba-
tants . . . , due process demands . . . a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that deten-
tion before a neutral decisionmaker.‖) (O‘Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
11
  See, e.g., Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine is Alive and Well: Why Critics of the 
Doctrine are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 111, 120 (2008) (―The move towards freer 
scrutiny of state actions is best explainable by the drastic changes in international law and foreign affairs 
that occurred in the decades between Underhill and Sabbatino.‖). 
12
  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (holding that application of 
the act of state doctrine applies as to a ―foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this 
country at the time of suit‖) (link); see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 
(2004) (applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) to expropriation pre-dating passage 
of the FSIA) (link). 
13
  Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 353 (1986). 
14
  493 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (9–0 decision, Scalia, J.) (emphasis added) (link). 
15
  See Bazyler, supra note 13, at 383–84. 
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ing.16  The United States and its allies during World War II initially commit-
ted to reversing Aryanizations,17 forced sales, and duress sales via restitu-
tion of ―readily identifiable works‖ directly to theft victims.18  As the Cold 
War set in and the Allies implemented the Marshall Plan, however, other is-
sues were prioritized over direct restitution.19  Thereafter, artworks were re-
turned to the nations from which they were taken; those nations were then 
expected to restitute the artworks to victims and their families, but many 
pieces were not restituted to their previous owners.20  A number of nations 
established post-War claims tribunals, but they were not widely successful 
in achieving justice.21  In order for victims to claim property, they needed to 
come forward with whatever scraps of evidence they could find in an era of 
destruction, closed archives, strict privacy laws, persistent anti-Semitism, 





  Judy Dempsey, Roadblocks Remain in Case of Paintings Lost to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/arts/29iht-loot.html?_r=1 (link) (noting that twenty percent 
of all Western art in Europe was looted during World War II); John R. Crook, Brief Notes, 105 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 160, 161 (2011) (The United States actively participates in the Task Force for International Co-
operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, which reports that ―an estimated 
650,000 artworks were confiscated by the Nazis in occupied Europe, including works by Pablo Picasso, 
Vincent [v]an Gogh, Salvador Dali and Claude Monet.  Furthermore, it is estimated that between 
100,000 to 200,000 works are still missing) (citing Online Database of Stolen Artworks Launched, THE 
TASK FORCE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUCATION, REMEMBRANCE, AND 
RESEARCH, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/news/234-online-database-of-stolen-
artworks-launched.html)). 
17
  Avraham Barkai, Arisierung, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST 84 (Israel Gutman ed., 1990) 
(―[T]erm used to denote the transfer of Jewish-owned independent economic enterprises to ‗Aryan‘ 
German ownership throughout the Third Reich and the countries it occupied.‖). 
18
  Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(citing PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS‘ ASSETS SR-142 (2000)). 
19
  Michael J. Kurtz, Resolving a Dilemma: The Inheritance of Jewish Property, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 625, 626 (1998) (―Though the commitment to restore cultural property was supposedly absolute 
and unconditional, the political failure of the Allied Control Council (‗ACC‘) in Germany and the onset 
of the Cold War in Eastern Europe raised significant barriers to a successful cultural restitution effort.‖); 
cf. Raymond Vernon, The World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and Devel-
opment, 36 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 329, 330 (1995) (describing how a 1948 draft agreement for the Interna-
tional Trade Organization languished as ―the Cold War grew more frigid, the Marshall Plan was 
launched, and the Korean War erupted‖). 
20
  See, e.g., Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 958 (describing evolution from direct restitution to external res-
titution and how ―[d]espite these restitution efforts, many paintings stolen by the Nazis were never re-
turned to their rightful owners.‖) (citing MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR 
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA‘S COURTS 204 (2003)). 
21
  E.g., id.; see also Benjamin Ferencz, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Personal Account, in JUSTICE 
FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 37, 38 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003) (―When the resti-
tution and indemnification laws were enacted, every claim had to be verified by a complex administra-
tive apparatus that put a strict burden of proof on every claimant.‖). 
22
  See, e.g., Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, the Individual, and 
Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605, 648 (2005) (describing post-War anti-Semitism in Austria); Kurtz, su-
pra note 19, at 632; Inga Markovits, Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and 
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Injustice pervaded post-War restitution.  France simply incorporated 
Jewish-owned artworks into the collection of the Louvre without ever at-
tempting to return them to the victims and their families.23  In Austria, vic-
tims seeking restitution of artworks were forced to make donations of other 
property in exchange for the necessary export permits to take the artworks 
to their new homelands.24  Renewed public attention to such scandals in the 
mid-to-late 1990s strengthened U.S. resolve to effectuate its War-era prom-
ises through means that included use of the courts to resolve state law 
claims. 
III. JUDICIAL RESTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Judicial restitution has played a key role in implementing executive 
policy to restitute property stolen from Jews within the Third Reich and 
Nazi-occupied territory.  This Part illuminates that role by first discussing 
the act of state doctrine and how its proper construction should not operate 
as a bar against judicial restitution of Holocaust-era art.  Then, this Part will 
discuss modern-era Holocaust litigation and diplomatic developments in-
tended to support judicial restitution of Holocaust-era art. 
A. The Act of State Doctrine Is No Bar to Judicial Restitution 
Nazi confiscation and expropriation, official governmental taking of 
property with or without compensation, occurred pursuant to the Nurem-
berg Laws and other official governmental decrees.25  Generally, under the 
act of state doctrine, the courts of one sovereign do not question the acts of 
                                                                                                                           
Forget About the Past—The Case of East Germany, 35 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 513, 519 (2001) (describing 
post-War anti-Semitism in East and West Germany); Thérèse O‘Donnell, The Restitution of Holocaust 
Looted Art and Transitional Justice: The Perfect Storm of the Raft of the Medusa?, 22 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 
49, 65 (2011) (describing how difficult research into an artwork‘s location was prior to the Internet); 
Collin McDonald, Note, Reconciling Holocaust Scholarship and Personal Data Protection: Facilitating 
Access to the International Tracing Service Archive, 30 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1360, 1384 (2007) (―[T]he 
effort to enact a rigorous data protection scheme might be better understood [as] an attempt to prevent 
additional harm befalling those who already suffered in the Holocaust . . . .‖) (link); Leah J. Weiss, 
Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 837, 866–67 (2007) (describing post-War difficulties for claims overall) (link). 
23
  See HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD‘S 
GREATEST WORKS OF ART 218–19, 235–36 (1997). 
24
  See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 684 (2004) (acknowledging that there 
were individuals in Austria who ―had been coerced into donating artworks to state museums in exchange 
for export permits‖). 
25
  See, e.g., MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS: THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE 
HOLOCAUST, 1933–1945 (2008) (describing systematic expropriation of Jews‘ property under Nurem-
berg laws and otherwise); GÖTZ ALY, HITLER‘S BENEFICIARIES: PLUNDER, RACIAL WAR, AND THE NAZI 
WELFARE STATE (2005) 184–86 (describing how the Nazis systematically expropriated Jewish property 
in occupied countries). 
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another sovereign acting in its sovereign capacity.26  The doctrine applies 
―to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a 
court, . . . for [the doctrine] rests at last upon the highest considerations of 
international comity and expediency.‖27 
The act of state doctrine, however, does not apply to the Nazi regime 
because it was a criminal organization.28  In an April 1949 letter, Jack B. 
Tate, U.S. Department of State Acting Legal Adviser, clarified executive 
policy concerning judicial restitution of Nazi-era despoiled property, at least 
insofar as the act of state doctrine was concerned.29  The letter relayed the 
following: 
 
[I]t is this Government‘s policy to undo the forced transfers 
and restitute identifiable property to the victims of Nazi 
persecution wrongfully deprived of such property; 
and . . . the policy of the Executive, with respect to claims 
asserted in the United States for restitution of such proper-
ty, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the 
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the 
acts of Nazi officials.30 
 
Courts, however, have wrangled with the act of state doctrine and the 





  See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int‘l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990); Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 
(1897) (link). 
27
  Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918). 
28
  See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 
376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (link); see also First Nat‘l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 
U.S. 759, 789 n.n.12 & 13 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Bernstein exception yet ac-
knowledging the argument for targeted exception for the Nazi regime in conversion cases) (link).  But 
see Westfield v. Germany, 633 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding a lack of jurisdiction under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act to sue Germany for Nazi-era taking). 
29
  Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 (discussing Tate Letter).  The State Department expressly delineated 
its position, albeit not in the context of a particular case, when renowned Fine Arts & Monuments Ad-
viser Ardelia R. Hall published in the State Department Bulletin on August 27, 1951: ―For the first time 
in history, restitution may be expected to continue for as long as works of art known to have been plun-
dered during a war continue to be rediscovered.‖  Ardelia R. Hall, The Recovery of Cultural Objects 
Dispersed During World War II, 25 DEP‘T ST. BULL. 337, 339 (1951). 
30
  Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 (quoting Press Release No. 296, U.S. Dept. of State, Jurisdiction of 
United States Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers (Apr. 27, 
1949)). 
31
  See generally Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power Of The Judiciary: Why the Use of State De-
partment “Statements of Interest” in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers 
Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 807, 833–34 (2006) (link); Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State 
Doctrine, supra note 13, at 330–62 (discussing inconsistent judicial application of the act of state doc-
trine since its early development); Catherine Henson Curlet, Note, Should a Statement of Interest Mat-
ter?: Judging Executive Branch Foreign Policy Concerns, 44 GA. L. REV. 1063 (2010). 
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questioned the continuing vitality of the act of state doctrine and noted that 
the argument for judicial deference is particularly weak ―if the government 
which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence.‖32  
The Supreme Court in Republic of Austria v. Altmann indicated that the 
views of the executive branch generally are not entitled to ―special defe-
rence,‖ but that particularized deference may be warranted if the State De-
partment were to communicate specific foreign policy ramifications of a 
particular case.33  In conclusion, although courts have struggled with the 
correct application of the act of state doctrine and separation of powers im-
plications arising from deferring to the executive branch, the act of state 
doctrine in no way restricts judicial power to decide cases that call into 
question acts of the criminal Nazi regime. 
B. Modern-Era Holocaust Litigation & Diplomatic Developments 
Not all Holocaust-era claims are the same, and the art cases were not 
subsumed in diplomatic agreements signed after the War or more recently 
that trumped claims filed in the 1990s.  The London Debt Agreement had 
been signed on February 27, 1953, by twenty nations, including the United 
States, with the Federal Republic of Germany to suspend payments on ex-
ternal debts, individuals‘ claims and reparations in deference to the Mar-
shall Plan.34  The purpose was to ―remove obstacles to normal economic 
relations.‖35  In 1991, the London Debt Agreement was lifted, which led to 
the modern wave of Holocaust-era litigation in the United States.36  By 
1995,  individual and class actions began to be filed in the United States 
against European nations and entities seeking compensation for such things 
as unpaid insurance policies, unrestituted bank accounts, and slave and 
forced labor.37  President Clinton entered into a series of executive agree-
ments whereby the United States would file ―statements of interest‖ in 
pending cases.38  A statement of interest is a non-binding document that ex-





  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 
33
  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004).  In fact, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act seeks to eliminate political motivation from judicial jurisdictional determinations.  See, 
e.g., Sigmund Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and 
Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976). 
34
  Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3 (the London 
Debt Agreement). 
35
  Id. at Preamble. 
36
  See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States 
Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 217 (2000). 
37
  See e.g., Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 403–05 (2003) (discussing Agreement on 
German External Debts, supra note 34, 4 U.S.T. at 449); Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on As-
pects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 795, 813–16 (2002). 
38
  See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 36, at 202 n.817. 
39
  Cf. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2003) (describing statements of inter-
est generally). 
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est promised in the Holocaust cases were to (and did) express the view that 
it was in the foreign policy interests of the United States to dismiss the cas-
es on ―any valid legal grounds‖ to achieve ―legal peace‖ for the European 
defendants,40 which it was hoped would lead to the return of normal diplo-
matic relations.  In exchange, new foundations were established throughout 
Europe that would consider individual claims and award compensation.41  
Claims to art, however, were excluded from the Clinton-era agreements, 
presumably because the value of the claims would have dwarfed the other 
claims and there is a great disparity in valuation of the art, much of which 
could not be located.42 
Art became a focus of post-Cold War diplomatic negotiations in 1998 
when the United States hosted the Washington Conference and garnered the 
signatures of forty-four nations to the Washington Principles (the Prin-
ciples).43  The non-binding Principles call on nations to facilitate identifica-
tion of Nazi-looted art and reach ―just and fair‖ solutions.44  In 2009, the 
Terezín Declaration, signed by forty-six nations, reinforced the Principles.45  
It provides that nations should: 
 
ensure that their legal systems or alternative processes, 
while taking into account the different legal traditions, faci-
litate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated 
and looted art, and . . . make certain that claims to recover 
such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts 
and merits of the claims and all the relevant documents 
submitted by all parties.46 
 
Thus, the United States has an international obligation to provide clai-
mants a means to seek restitution.  Unlike a number of other countries, the 
United States has not yet built a commission to resolve such claims.47  Thus, 
going to court to assert a ―garden-variety‖ state law conversion or replevin-





  See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 406. 
41
  E.g., HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY (Michael 
Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006). 
42
  Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose in 
Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 165–66 (2007). 
43
  U.S. State Dep‘t, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, in WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS PROCEEDINGS 971, 971–72 (1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocaust/heacappen.pdf (link). 
44
  Id. 
45
  U.S. DEPT. STATE, TEREZIN DECLARATION (June 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm (link). 
46  Id. (emphasis added). 
47
  E.g., NORMAN PALMER, MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27, 
104 (2000) (discussing the UK Spoliation Advisory Panel and the French commission). 
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caust-era art in the United States.48  As discussed below, the manner in 
which U.S. courts are dismissing such claims has rendered the United States 
out of compliance with the very principles it led the world to adopt. 
IV. THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE IN NAZI-LOOTED ART 
RESTITUTION 
Unfortunately, the outcome of Holocaust-era art litigation often turns 
on statutes of limitations and other technical doctrines.  This Part will ana-
lyze both time-bar and preemption doctrines implicated by such litigation 
and how courts misapply them, perhaps out of a misplaced deference to in-
correct assumptions about federal executive policy. 
A. Statutes of Limitations and Other Time-Bar Doctrines 
Under the American common law, it is axiomatic that the title to stolen 
art does not pass to the new owner except in limited circumstances involv-
ing certain bailments.  However, time-bar doctrines and other technicalities 
could bar a claim by the rightful owner.49  For example, under the discovery 
rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff dis-
covers the loss and location of his or her stolen property—or should have 
done so.50  Currently, courts are often construing time-bar doctrines in Ho-
locaust art cases in a way that faults survivors and their heirs for waiting too 
long to seek restitution, even though in most cases it would have been im-
possible or futile to seek restitution earlier, thereby distorting discovery rule 
and related jurisprudence.51  For example, one federal court in Michigan 
ruled that the discovery rule was inapplicable, in part because of the policy 
to encourage the plaintiff ―to diligently pursue his claim,‖ and hence the 
statute of limitations on one German Jew‘s claim ran in 1938.52 
Perhaps courts are construing time-bar doctrines to dismiss seemingly 
meritorious claims out of an unstated and misplaced fear of injecting them-
selves into foreign affairs.  A broad-brush understanding of the class actions 
filed in the mid-1990s, most of which were dismissed based on various 
judicial deference doctrines, such as the political question and international 





  E.g., Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between 
Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955 (2001) (link). 
49
  See, e.g., Alexandra Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of Laches in World War II-Era Art 
Theft Disputes: It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 349 (2004). 
50
  E.g., Erisoty v. Rizik, No. Civ. A. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) 
(providing overview of discovery rule and other time-bar doctrines). 
51
  Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record from the Nazi-Era Art Litigation Tum-
bling Toward the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 253, 260–62 (2011) (link).  
52
  Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 
2007). 
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claims must similarly be dismissed.53  Rather than look into the thorny cas-
es, courts seem to be willing to engage in ―judicial abdication of their re-
sponsibility for resolving international law issues.‖54 
B. Preemption 
The California state legislature has sought to do something about the 
judicial misinterpretation of statutes of limitations and discovery rule prin-
ciples, but judicial trepidation about interfering with foreign affairs seems 
thus far to have foiled its efforts.  The California legislature passed Califor-
nia Civil Procedure Code Section 354.3 in 2002, which extended the statute 
of limitations for claims seeking restitution from museums and galleries to 
December 31, 2010.55  As discussed below, California‘s abandonment of 
discovery rule principles in favor of a firm statute of limitations for Holo-
caust-era claims has put the spotlight on the federal-state balance in Holo-
caust-art restitution, a field that necessarily touches upon foreign affairs. 
Earlier Supreme Court case law outside of the Holocaust art context 
had established that, while there can be ―no question that at some point an 
exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the 
National Government‘s policy,‖56 ―even treaties . . . will be carefully con-
strued so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States 
of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.‖57  
Thus, the Supreme Court has been careful to preserve state power even if it 
may touch on foreign relations, although the federal government retains the 





  See, e.g., Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dis-
missing a class action claim for lack of jurisdiction and, alternatively, on political question and interna-
tional comity grounds and noting that ―a ‗lack of respect‘ to the Executive Branch would result if the 
Court were to disregard the Executive's declared preference . . . to resolve these claims ‗outside of litiga-
tion.‘‖) (link). 
54
  See Bazyler, supra note 13, at 383 (discussing the doctrine generally) (internal quotation omit-
ted); accord, e.g., Frank Walsh, Flipping the Act of State Presumption: Protecting America’s Interna-
tional Investors from Foreign Nationalization Programs, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 369, 381–91 (2008) 
(discussing ―muddled jurisprudence‖ of the act of state doctrine since Sabbatino). 
55
  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(c) (West 2006) (link).  California has passed other legislation 
concerning Holocaust claims and claims arising out of the Armenian genocide, all of which have been 
challenged in courts.  See Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (finding unconstitu-
tional California‘s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999); Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 
692, 703 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional a California statute creating a cause of action for 
claims involving Second World War slave labor) (link).  But see Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 
AG, 629 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (2–1 opinion) (upholding legislation extending statute of limita-
tions for Armenian genocide claims and replacing earlier opinion holding the opposite) (link).  It is vir-
tually impossible to reconcile Movsesian and Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(link), discussed below, with Von Saher and Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 
1085 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that Armenian genocide property claims are preempted) (link). 
56
  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 
n.25 (1964)). 
57
  United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (link). 
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The federal-state balance was disrupted in Von Saher v. Norton Simon 
Museum of Art at Pasadena58 when the Ninth Circuit misapplied the 
preemption doctrine.  The two-judge majority completely misconstrued ex-
ecutive involvement in art recovery59 to conclude, without support, that in 
light of executive war-era efforts to restitute art and its decision to imple-
ment the Marshall Plan, ―[i]t is beyond dispute that there was no role for in-
dividual states to play in the restitution of Nazi-looted assets during and 
immediately following the war.‖60 
The panel incorrectly interpreted the significance of executive efforts; 
the executive never expressed an intent to displace judicial restitution as an 
option available to survivors seeking to recover their art.  In fact, since the 
War, survivors and heirs have filed successful claims in federal and state 
courts to recover art and other property.61  The State Department Special 
Envoy for Holocaust Issues specifically recognized that the U.S. Govern-
ment has a limited role in cases involving claimants and private institu-
tions.62  The State Department has never had any intention of shutting down 
courts as an avenue of restitution.  Nor did the California legislature open 
courts up for the first time.  The legislation simply tried to prevent courts 
from misapplying discovery rule doctrines to dismiss cases that should not 
be dismissed.  In other words, Section 354.3 seeks to make California‘s pro-
plaintiff time-bar policy clearer.  This is proper because there has never 
been a federal effort to preempt state authority on the matter. 
The Von Saher majority relied on American Insurance Ass’n v. Gara-
mendi, a Supreme Court case that struck down California‘s Holocaust Vic-
tim Insurance Relief Act (the HVIRA) under the foreign affairs field 
preemption doctrine.63  The HVIRA required insurance companies operat-
ing in the state to disclose information about policies they or their affiliates 
wrote in Europe between 1920 and 1945, even if such disclosure was not 
under the insurance company‘s direct control and such disclosure was pro-
hibited by European privacy laws.64 
The Clinton-era executive agreements provided that the United States 





  592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
59
  Id. at 961–63. 
60
  Id. at 967. 
61
  See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973); Bernstein v. 
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per cu-
riam); Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). 
62
  J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Remarks at University of Potsdam 
Conference (April 23, 2007), available at http://germany.usembassy.gov/kennedy_speech.html (―Be-
cause art claims in the United States have generally had a claimant on one side and a private institution 
or individual collector on the other, the role of the U.S. Government has been limited on specific cas-
es.‖) (link). 
63
  See Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003). 
64
  Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) of 1999, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800–07 (West 
2006). 
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tion in the newly created European foundations.65  Insurance claims were to 
be resolved on a voluntary basis by the International Commission on Holo-
caust Era Insurance Claims (the ICHEIC) after insurance companies pro-
vided whatever documentation they could find related to the claims.66  Even 
though none of the executive agreements or supporting documents specifi-
cally addressed disclosure of insurance policy information, the Garamendi 
majority held by a five-to-four margin that the California statute interfered 
with foreign affairs policy objectives implicit in the executive agreements.67 
The Von Saher majority applied Garamendi with an extremely broad 
brush and concluded that the California legislation was preempted by ex-
ecutive war-era restitution efforts and Clinton-era executive agreements.68  
In effect, the panel ruled that even though state law may provide for a gene-
ralized conversion claim with regard to stolen art, a state is powerless to re-
fine its statute of limitations as to Holocaust-specific restitution claims. 
A correct interpretation of Garamendi would have recognized that a 
state does have the power to refine its statute of limitations to prevent its 
courts from misapplying fluid discovery rule and time-bar principles in Ho-
locaust-era art cases.  Focusing on Justice Harlan‘s concurrence in Zscher-
nig v. Miller, the only other Supreme Court case to find that executive 
policy short of a treaty preempted state law, illustrates why.  Justice Harlan 
pointed out that, absent a direct conflict between state law and executive 
policy, ―the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence 
even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign rela-
tions.‖69  California‘s Section 354.3 concerns the statute of limitations on 
common law property claims, certainly an area of traditional state compe-
tence.  Arguments about its effect on foreign affairs are likely overblown, as 
common law Holocaust-era claims may be brought in any state and are sub-
ject to the flexible discovery rule-type doctrines that normally apply.  For 
example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York recently ruled that a claim for a rare book stolen during the War was 
not barred because the claimant mistakenly, yet reasonably, believed the 
book had been destroyed during the War.70 
Section 354.3 is far narrower than the HVIRA, which the Supreme 





  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405–06. 
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  Id. at 406–07. 
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  Id. at 420–25, 430. 
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  Id. at 413–29. 
69
  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (link); see also id. at 462 
(White, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Harlan that the challenged statute was not ―an impermissi-
ble interference with foreign affairs‖). 
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  E.g., Sotheby‘s, Inc. v. Shene, No. 04 Civ. 10067, 2009 WL 762697, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 
2009) (holding that a sixty-year delay was not unreasonable because the claimant erroneously yet rea-
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fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.‖71  The HVIRA 
also expressly stated that it applied to European affiliates of in-state compa-
nies, over which California would have had no personal jurisdiction.72  In 
contrast, Section 354.3 makes no such extravagant jurisdictional claims; 
thus, it will apply only to those entities over which California has personal 
jurisdiction.  In fact, the Norton Simon Museum of Pasadena, the defendant 
in Von Saher, and the art in question are physically located in California; 
the facts of the case pose absolutely no extravagant personal jurisdiction is-
sues. 
Thus, Garamendi does not dictate the result in Von Saher and the Su-
preme Court should correct judicial misinterpretation of state and judicial 
power when it comes to Holocaust-era art claims.  When judges, in the ab-
sence of an applicable executive agreement, construe executive policy so 
broadly so as to preempt conversion claims as to Holocaust-era art, they are 
acting as ―the expositors of the Nation‘s foreign policy . . . when the Presi-
dent himself has not taken a clear stand.‖73  Justice Ginsburg stated in the 
Garamendi dissent, ―As I see it, courts step out of their proper role when 
they rely on no legislative or even executive text, but only on inference and 
implication, to preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds.‖74 
The Von Saher majority incorrectly concluded that the California legis-
lature created a ―world-wide forum for the resolution of Holocaust restitu-
tion claims‖75 and thus could assert ―no serious claim to be addressing a 
traditional state responsibility.‖76  The majority erred in concluding that the 
statute ―intrudes on the power to make and resolve war.‖77  Even though 
former enemies were not targets—the defendant was an in-state museum—
the court held that ―the actionable injury at the heart of the statute is the Na-
zi theft of art,‖78 and the statute was enacted ―with the aim of rectifying 
wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by parties operating under 
our enemies‘ protection.‖79  For all of the reasons stated above, the Von 
Saher majority painted the scope of federal restitution efforts far too broad-
ly, thus deferring to an erroneous interpretation of the significance of execu-
tive action for foreign affairs.  By refusing to reach the merits of the claim, 
the court was making its own decision, unsupported by any federal interest, 





  Garamendi, 539 U.S.at 427. 
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  See id. at 409–10. 
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  Id. at 442–43. 
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  Id. at 443. 
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  Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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  Id. (quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation 
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  Id. at 966. 
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  Id. (quoting Deutsch v. Turner Corp, 324 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks 
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a blind eye and feign not to decide is to decide.80  The Von Saher court the-
reby engaged in improper policymaking. 
The Von Saher majority also ignored the fact that in Republic of Aus-
tria v. Altmann, a California case that ultimately resulted in Austria restitut-
ing over $300 million worth of Holocaust-era art,81 the Supreme Court 
passed up an easy opportunity to shut down a claim on preemption grounds.  
The Court decided that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA), 
the only means to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in U.S. 
courts, provided for jurisdiction over Austria.82  Moreover, the United States 
did not file a statement of interest in Altmann, which would have encour-
aged the court to dismiss the case ―on any legal ground.‖83  Instead, it filed 
an amicus brief on the narrow issue of FSIA interpretation.84 
Additionally, the Von Saher majority opinion unsuccessfully distin-
guished art restitution from the property restitution sought in Alperin v. Va-
tican Bank.  In Alperin, another split Ninth Circuit panel authorized pursuit 
of ―garden-variety property‖ state law claims against the Vatican for alle-
gedly accepting property from the genocidal, Holocaust-era Croatian Usta-
sha regime, while finding slave and forced labor claims preempted under 
the executive preemption doctrine.85  In rejecting an argument that the polit-
ical question doctrine prohibited judicial resolution of the claim, the Alperin 
court noted that ―[r]eparation for stealing, even during wartime, is not a 
claim that finds textual commitment in the Constitution [to the federal ex-
ecutive branch].‖86  Thus, a court would have power to award restitution or 
money damages for such stolen property.87  In contrast, the Von Saher ma-
jority simply rejected without support the ―garden-variety property‖ charac-
terization of suits seeking restitution of property converted during a time of 
war.88  There is no reason to welcome Croatian war-era state law property 





  Cf. Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (holding that upholding a foreign act of 
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  Diane Haithman, Coming and Going, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, 
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It is possible that the executive branch will remain silent or even ap-
pear in Von Saher to encourage dismissal, which would contravene the 
1998 Washington Principles and 2009 Terezín Declaration, in which the 
United States committed to providing for restitution of Holocaust-era art.  
Such a development would be quite unfortunate, but courts have a constitu-
tional obligation to resolve cases and controversies, even if that means ne-
gating the expressed desires of a political branch.89  As stated in Baker v. 
Carr, it would be an ―error to suppose that every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.‖90 
Hopefully the Supreme Court will uphold Section 354.3, the California 
statute at issue in Von Saher.  It would be even better, in light of the diffi-
culty Holocaust survivors and heirs have had in discovering their claims be-
fore now, if the Supreme Court emphasized the executive branch‘s support 
of claims.  Such a holding would go a long way toward helping survivors 
and their heirs circumvent the overly rigid application of time-bar and other 
technical doctrines.  If Von Saher goes unchecked, claimants would be de-
prived of assistance that state legislatures can provide to clarify time-bar 
doctrines for Holocaust-era claims. 
V. TRYING TO RESET THE DELICATE BALANCE FOR JUDICIAL 
RESTITUTION BASED ON STATE LAW 
Efforts to restore prospects for restitution of Holocaust-era art have 
emerged, but none can succeed unless state law court claims are viable.  
State law reformers secured new California legislation.  On the judicial 
front, another important California case has surpassed a significant hurdle 
to proceed against Spain.  Additionally, there is a possibility that a commis-
sion will be created in the State Department to attempt to resolve Holo-
caust-era art claims out of court. 
A. California Legislative Reform Efforts 
While the petition for certiorari in Von Saher was pending before the 
Supreme Court,91 the California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 2765, 
which was signed into law by then-Governor Schwarzenegger on August 
30, 2010.92  The legislation requires actual discovery (presumably both of 
the claim and entity to sue) and doubles the length of time allowed between 
actual discovery and commencement of the cause of action to recover art 
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new and pending causes of action commenced on or before December 31, 
2017.94  It would also include actions that were ―dismissed based on the ex-
piration of statutes of limitation in effect prior to the date of enactment‖ of 
the bill so long as either the judgment is not yet final or the time for filing 
an appeal has not yet passed.95  The statute also includes a definition of ―du-
ress‖ broader than that implied in any U.S. case to date.96 
There are limits to the new statute.  Present-day possessors of art can 
still assert legal and equitable defenses, including the statute of limitations 
(of course) and the equitable defense of laches, which would bar a claim if 
the plaintiff‘s unreasonable and inexcusable delay caused defendant preju-
dice in his or her ability to defend the suit.97  Like the earlier California sta-
tute, there is no limitation requiring that the museums and galleries sued be 
located in California,98 although they must, of course, be subject to personal 
jurisdiction there under International Shoe and its progeny. 
B. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain 
While this state legislation was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued a rul-
ing that permitted another Holocaust-era art suit to go forward.  In Cassirer 
v. Kingdom of Spain, the en banc panel held that Spain and its instrumental-
ity, the Madrid-based Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, are sub-
ject to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception of the FSIA even 
though it was the Nazis, not Spain, that engaged in the expropriation.99 
Cassirer held that the plain language of the expropriation exception, 
which provides for jurisdiction over claims to property ―taken in violation 
of international law,‖ has no requirement as to who must actually engage in 
the taking.100  The court then found that the Foundation is engaged in suffi-
cient commercial activity in the United States—advertising for tourism—to 





  Id. at § 338 (c)(3)(B). 
95
  Id. 
96
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claim was not at issue in the appeal,102 but the fact that the Ninth Circuit is 
allowing the claim to proceed is somewhat in tension with the Von Saher 
holding that Holocaust-era art claims are preempted.  The Supreme Court 
granted a writ of certiorari in the case and, as it did in Von Saher, asked the 
Solicitor General to submit a brief explaining the executive branch‘s 
views.103 
C. A State Department Commission? 
The State Department is currently developing a plan to establish a Na-
zi-Looted Art Commission, but its mandate would be limited to researching 
and mediating or arbitrating claims only if both parties agree.104  At this 
point, given the extraordinarily weak track record claimants have in U.S. 
courts, what leverage will they have to convince present-day possessors of 
art to voluntarily agree to resolve claims in a commission?  One can only 
hope that the moral suasion of the United States can someday convince 
present-day possessors to give up their seeming advantage and instead have 
claims objectively resolved on their merits. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court does not correct Von Saher, then the need for 
Congress to enact federal legislation eliminating the statute of limitations 
defense in Holocaust-era art cases is acute.  However, that need is unlikely 
to be satisfied given that Congress‘s attention is fixed on the country‘s eco-
nomic crises and events in the Middle East.  If states have been stripped of 
their ability to modify limitations periods, then museums and other present-
day possessors can even more readily assert technical defenses to block any 
objective investigation of the merits of the claims.105  There will be very 
few, if any, ―just and fair‖ resolutions in the United States anymore.  The 
United States would be in violation of the very principles it led the world to 
sign in 1998.  The remaining impetus to garner some justice for survivors of 
the ―unfinished business‖ of the War would die, along with the remaining 
survivors who have waited so long to be rejoined with portraits of their 
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